There is a developing body of legal reasoning in the United Kingdom Supreme Court in which members of the senior judiciary have asserted the primary role of common law constitutional rights and critiqued legal arguments based first and foremost on the Human Rights Act 1998. Their calls for a shift in legal reasoning have created a sense amongst both scholars and the judiciary that something significant is happening. Yet despite renewed academic and judicial interest we have limited insight into what common law constitutional rights we have, how they work and what they offer. This book is the first collection of its kind to systematically explore both the content and role of individual common law constitutional rights alongside the constitutional significance and broader implications of these developments. It therefore contributes not only to our understanding of what the common law might be capable of offering in terms of the protection of rights, but also to our understanding of the nature of the constitutional order of which such rights are an integral part. In a time where the Human Rights Act remains under threat from a hostile government, it is right that we take seriously the judiciary's suggestion that the common law can provide the necessary protection of fundamental liberties. While this volume appears sceptical about the law's current ability to do so, each and every essay is a valuable contribution to this debate, which one suspects will continue to rage on for some time.