Compellence, Clausewitz, and Counterinsurgency -- a seemingly strange trinity -- in actuality, they are closely related subjects with particular relevance in today's world. The United States has engaged in numerous compellent military actions during the decade of the 1990s; the first five years of the new millennium have seen this trend continue. Despite the country's obvious affinity for this form of warfare, there is little written about it in U.S. military doctrine or strategy documents. Similarly, while a clear compellence construct exists within Carl von Clausewitz's seminal book, On War -- which is studied extensively in military academies and war colleges -- the compellence aspects of Clausewitz's work have not been identified as such previously, and consequently are not emphasized or taught to military officers and strategists. This paper corrects that shortfall and presents Clausewitz's concept of compellence as a coherent framework. Furthermore, with an on-going counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, it is useful to examine the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency from the standpoint of compellence.